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Welfare comparisons between funded and pay-as-you-go (PAYG) pension systems are
often made using the Aaron condition. However, the Aaron condition as usually stated
is not precise enough about the exact form of the PAYG pension system. PAYG pen-
sion systems can be either of the dened-benet or dened-contribution variety. They
can also dier with regard to intra-generational redistribution. For example, pension
benets can be 
at or earnings related. Here, four alternative PAYG pension systems
are considered. It is shown that each system generates its own Aaron condition. In
addition, the standard Aaron condition assumes that the wage rate and labor partici-
pation rate does not vary across individuals and that the rate of population growth is
constant and exogenous. These assumptions are also relaxed. Using US data covering
the period 1933-2001, I then show that the results of comparisons between PAYG and
funded systems depend critically on exactly which variety of PAYG system is being
compared, and that PAYG systems are becoming less attractive over time as fertility
rates decline. (JEL H55, J13, J14)
Keywords: Aaron Condition; Pay-As-You-Go Pension; Funded Pension; Dened Con-
tribution; Dened Benet; Labor Participation Rate; Fertility Rate
This article is based on chapter 2 of my PhD dissertation. See Steurer (2008).1 Introduction
In the rst decades after World War II it seemed that pay-as-you-go (PAYG) pension
systems provided countries with a cheap way of supporting retirees. The generation that
failed to accumulate adequate funds for retirement due to war, the great depression,
and (in some countries) hyper-in
ation, could receive pensions without contributing to
the system. Growing populations and rapid economic growth meant that the internal
rate of return of PAYG pension systems were high and that nancing even the most
generous unfunded system in the future seemed not that onerous. But recent declines in
the fertility rates and the resulting pressures on many governments' budgets are causing
governments to reassess their pension systems.
One crucial (and much discussed) distinction between dierent pension systems is
whether they are funded or PAYG (see e.g., Feldstein 1985, Davis 1995, Blake 2000,
and Bolle 2000). In funded systems each generation saves for their own retirement.
Thus no inter-generational redistribution exists. In PAYG systems the current young
workers nance the pension benets of the current old generation and will in turn
receive payments from the young when they themselves are old. Thus there exists an
inter-generational transfer from young to old in each period.
Welfare comparisons between funded and PAYG pension systems have sometimes
been made using the Aaron condition (based on work by Samuelson 1958 and Aaron
1966), which shows how the relative performance of these systems depends on the inter-
est rate and the growth rate of wages and fertility.1 However, the Aaron condition as it
is usually stated assumes steady state conditions and does not take into consideration
that PAYG pension systems can dier in a number of important ways.
PAYG systems (as well as funded systems) can be organized either on a dened
benet (DB) or dened contribution (DC) basis.2 This distinction { although not much
1For empirical examples see Davis (1995) or Blake (2000).
2The term \dened contribution pension system" is used here as in Bolle (2000) and should not
1discussed in the pension literature { is very important when discussing PAYG pension
systems where contributions of one generation benet another. In DB systems the
pension benet formula is xed in advance but the contribution rate that is needed to
nance the system will adjust depending on economic and demographic developments.
In DC systems it is the pension contributions that are xed over time with the pen-
sion levels adjusting to economic and demographic changes. DB systems provide more
income security for the retirees but less security about the cost of running the system
(the necessary tax contributions). A DC system on the other hand provides certainty
about the contribution levels (tax rates) but will provide reduced income security for
retirees.
In recent years a number of papers have considered the impact of declining fertility
rates on PAYG pension systems. However, the importance of the distinction between
DB and DC PAYG pension systems has been largely overlooked.
This dierence is of particular importance when discussing the so called \pension
crisis" in many OECD countries arising from declining fertility rates (see Disney 2000
and Cigno and Werding 2007). While it is true that DB-PAYG systems will lead to
increased public spending (decits) as population aging occurs, this is not the case for
a DC-PAYG system. In a DC-PAYG system population aging will lead to downward
pressure on the level of pension benets (thus reducing the replacement rate) rather
than putting upward pressure on the budget decit. Thus population aging in a DC-
be confused with the \notional dened contribution system" which is sometimes referred to as a DC
system in the pensions literature. The basic structure of a notional dened contribution system remains
PAYG, but with a number of elements that provide a close link between taxes paid by individuals and
their pension entitlements. Generally each worker receives a virtual pension account into which funds
from his/her payroll taxation are credited (but generally not received). At the end of the working life
individuals then receive a pension that is closely linked to the virtual funds they accumulated in their
virtual pension accounts. In this sense notional dened contribution systems are closely linked to the
earnings related dened contribution (ER-DC-PAYG) systems considered in this article.
2PAYG system would lead to an \old age poverty crisis" instead of a budget decit
crisis.
It is therefore important that countries fully understand the implications of switch-
ing (or not switching) from one system to another. Most countries currently have
DC-PAYG pension systems. However, recently, a small but growing number of coun-
tries have introduced DC-PAYG systems under the guidance of the World Bank, as part
of the transition from DB-PAYG systems to fully funded DC systems (see Holzmann
and Hinz 2005). Chile is probably the country that comes closest to a pure DC system.
However, DC elements have recently been introduced in a number of countries that
previously had pure DB systems (for example in Sweden, Italy, Poland, Latvia, and
Russia).
Another distinction is whether pension benets are related to an individual's prior
labor market performance or not.3 Here I refer to a system in which pension payments
are related to prior market performance (or tax contribution) as \earnings related" (ER)
and those in which no such connection exists as \
at" systems.4 Under earnings related
(ER) systems individual pension benets are linked (proportionally) to an individual's
prior labor market income - and therefore also to her prior tax payments if the pension
system is funded by a payroll tax. When retiring in period t + 1 an old person who
has worked in period t receives a public pension which is proportionally linked to her
tax contributions in period t via the replacement rate. For funded ER systems this
replacement rate is directly related to the market interest rate. In ER-PAYG systems
there is generally no direct link to the market interest rate. Depending on whether
3Pension payments could also be linked to individual fertility levels (see Kolmar 1997, Cigno, Lu-
porini and Pettini 2003, and Cigno and Werding 2007). Kolmar (1997), in particular, considers some
of the implications of fertility based payments for the Aaron condition. I do not consider fertility based
payments here.
4In the literature these two forms of PAYG pension systems are sometimes referred to as Bismarckian
and Beveridgean respectively. See for example p. 16 of Cigno and Werding (2007).
3the ER-PAYG system is of the dened benet (DB) or the dened contribution (DC)
variety, the replacement rate is known to the individual in advance (in the DB case) or
not (in the DC case).
In all types of ER systems, high income earners receive higher pension payments
than low income earners. Thus, there may be little intra-generational redistribution
in ER-systems. In contrast, in a 
at system every old person of a generation receives
the same pension payments independently of her prior market performance and prior
tax payments. Thus, in a 
at system, there exists intra-generational redistribution.
Dierences in the performance of 
at and ER systems can only be investigated within a
model that allows for heterogeneous agents. This heterogeneity across agents can arise
either from dierences in wage rates across individuals or due to dierences in labor
participation rates.
The remainder of this article is structured as follows. First, the standard Aaron
condition is derived. Then it is shown how the Aaron condition generalizes when the
wage rate and labor participation rate are allowed to vary across individuals. Once we
allow for heterogeneity across individuals, the question then arises as to whether there
is any intra-generational redistribution within the PAYG pension system. This issue is
not addressed by the standard Aaron condition. I consider two varieties of DC-PAYG
pension system. The rst is an earnings related (ER) system with no intra-generational
redistribution. The second is a 
at system in which all retirees of a particular generation
receive the same pension benet irrespective of how much they have paid into the
system. These two pension systems generate dierent Aaron conditions. For DB-
PAYG pensions, again, once I allow for variations in wage and labor participation
rates, a distinction can be drawn between ER-DB-PAYG and 
at-DB-PAYG pension
systems. These pension systems also generate their own Aaron conditions. In total,
I consider four possible scenarios. These are illustrated in Table 1. Using US data
covering the period 1933-2001, I then show that the results of comparisons between
4PAYG and funded systems depend critically on exactly which variety of PAYG system
is being compared, and that PAYG systems are becoming less attractive over time as
fertility rates decline.
Insert Table 1 Here
2 The Standard Aaron Condition
The Aaron condition compares the rates of return of a funded and PAYG pension
system.5 I consider an overlapping generations setting where each individual is assumed
to live for two periods. In the rst period, an individual works and in the second she is
retired. Aaron (1966) assumes that the economy is in steady state (i.e., population and
wages are growing at a constant rate). This assumption will be relaxed in subsequent
sections. If the economy is in steady state (and there is no heterogeneity between
individuals) the rate of return from DB and DC PAYG pension systems is identical and
thus there will be only one type of Aaron condition.
The (gross) rate of return on a funded pension system earned by an individual is
given by the gross market interest rate, 1 + r. The rate of return on a PAYG pension
system for any individual is determined by the ratio of benets received and contribu-
tions paid, q=p, where q is the replacement rate (i.e., the fraction of net income earned
when young that an individual receives upon retirement), and p is the contribution to
the PAYG pension system made by a young individual. Assuming its budget is bal-
anced with respect to the PAYG pension system, the government faces the following
budget constraint in each period t:
wt 1Nt 1q = (1 + 
)wt 1(1 + n)Nt 1p; (1)
where wt 1 and Nt 1 denote, respectively, the wage rate and the number of young
people in period t   1. (1 + 
) and (1 + n) denote the growth rate of wages and
5The analysis is all done in terms of real rates of return.
5population from one period to the next, both of which are assumed to be exogenous.
The left-hand side of (1) depicts the pension liability of the government to the present
old generation while the right-hand side depicts the total pension contributions of the
young generation. From (1) it follows that q=p = (1 + 
)(1 + n). This implies that a
funded pension system generates a lower rate of return than a PAYG pension system if
the gross market interest rate satises the following inequality:
(1 + r) < (1 + 
)(1 + n): (2)
If the inequality is reversed, then a funded pension system generates a higher rate of
return than a PAYG pension system.
3 Modifying the Aaron Condition for DC-PAYG
Pension Systems
3.1 An Earning-Related-Dened-Contribution (ER-DC) PAYG
Pension System
The Aaron condition as stated in (2) is only one of a number of Aaron conditions that
could be derived for PAYG pension systems. In steady state the ratio q=p remains
constant over time, and thus the rate of return on DB and DC type PAYG systems
will be the same. Outside steady state however the ratio q=p will not remain constant
but will re
ect economic and demographic developments. In DC systems p is kept xed
while q will vary over time to balance the government budget. In DB systems on the
other hand q will be xed while p will vary over time.
Aaron (1966) also assumes that the wage rate and labor participation rate is the
same for all individuals of the same generation. This section considers the implications
of relaxing these assumptions in DC systems. Discussion of dened benet (DB) systems
6is deferred until the next section.
Once wage and labor participation rates are allowed to dier across individuals,
the issue of intra-generational redistribution becomes important. Two alternative DC-
PAYG pension systems are considered here. The rst is an earning related (ER) system
with no intra-generational redistribution.
Let wi
t and zi
t denote, respectively, the wage rate and labor participation rate of
individual i in the young generation of period t. qt+1 is the replacement rate in period
t+1 while p is the (xed) contribution rate to the PAYG system. Assuming there is no

















As before, a young individual in period t earns a higher return on the PAYG pension
system as compared to a funded system if (1+rt+1) < qt+1=p. In other words, the Aaron
condition is












If we assume that the covariance between the wage rate and labor participation rate











t = Ntwtzt.6 In this case, the Aaron condition reduces to
(1 + rt+1) < (1 + 
t+1)(1 + nt+1)(1 + gt+1); (4)
where 1 + 
t+1 = wt+1=wt, 1 + nt+1 = Nt+1=Nt and 1 + gt+1 = zt+1=zt. This new
version of the Aaron condition now includes the growth rate of labor participation, and
recognizes that the growth rate of wages and population can vary over time.
6This assumption is less problematic for men than for women. MaCurdy, Green, and Paarsch (1990)
nd that both income and substitution eects of wage changes are close to zero for prime aged men.
However, female labor force participation tends to be positively correlated with the wage rate (p. 1999,
Ehrenberg and Smith 1996).
73.2 A Flat-Dened-Contribution (Flat-DC) PAYG Pension Sys-
tem
Consider now a 
at-DC PAYG pension system. Under this system all retirees in period
t+1 receive the same pension Qt+1, irrespective of how much they paid into the pension
system the previous period. This means that the PAYG pension redistributes from high
income individuals to low income individuals in each generation. The government's














t+1 represents the pension contributions of the young in period t + 1.
Individual i who is young in period t will prefer the PAYG system over the market
system if the internal rate of return of the pension system dominated that of the mar-
ket; that is if Qt+1=(pwi
tzi
t) > (1 + rt+1). Using the government budget constraint to
substitute for Qt+1, this inequality can be rearranged as follows:









This inequality represents the Aaron condition for the 
at DC-PAYG system. It diers
from the ones above in that now it is no longer the case that all individuals of a given
generation must have the same ranking of a funded and PAYG pension. In particular,
the higher individual i's income (i.e., wi
tzi
t), the less likely it is that she will prefer the
PAYG pension system to the funded system.
If we again assume that the covariance between the wage rate and labor participation
rate across individuals in each generation is zero, then for a young individual with the
average income in period t, this Aaron condition reduces to the same inequality as under
an ER-DC-PAYG system. The PAYG system is preferred to the market system if:
(1 + rt+1) < (1 + 
t+1)(1 + nt+1)(1 + gt+1):
84 Modifying the Aaron Condition for DB-PAYG
Pension Systems
4.1 An Earning-Related-Dened-Benet (ER-DB) PAYG Pen-
sion System
Under a DB-PAYG system, the payment received on retirement is xed, while the tax
rate on workers is adjusted to balance the government's budget. Again I compare a
PAYG and funded pension system from the perspective of a young individual in period
t. One important dierence with DB-PAYG systems as compared with DC-PAYG
systems is that, from the perspective of the young generation in period t, the relevant
government budget constraint is the one for period t not t + 1. This is because this is
where the pension contribution rate vt is set to balance the budget. The pension benet
rate x remains unchanged over time in an ER-DB-PAYG system.
Again, as in the previous section, I allow wage and labor participation rates to dier
across individuals. This in turn makes the issue of intra-generational redistribution
important and hence it is again necessary to consider the implications of an earnings
related as well as a 
at system.
An earnings related (ER) DB-PAYG system with no intra-generational redistribu-
















The left hand side of (6) represents the benets accrued by the old in period t, while the
right hand side represents the pension contributions of the young in period t. As before,
a young individual in period t earns a higher return on the PAYG pension system if
x=vt > (1 + rt+1). In other words, the Aaron condition is












9If we assume that the covariance between the wage rate and labor participation rate
across individuals in each generation is zero, then the Aaron condition can be rewritten
as
(1 + rt+1) < (1 + 
t)(1 + nt)(1 + gt); (7)
where 1 + 
t = wt=wt 1, 1 + nt = Nt=Nt 1, and 1 + gt = zt=zt 1.
4.2 A Flat-Dened-Benet (Flat-DB) PAYG Pension System
Consider now a 
at-DB PAYG pension system. This means all retirees in period t + 1
receive the same pension X, irrespective of the size of their individual contribution,
vtwi
tzi
t, paid into the pension system in period t. The PAYG pension, therefore, re-
distributes from high income individuals to low income individuals in each generation.









Individual i who is young in period t will prefer the PAYG system if X=(vtwi
tzi
t) >
(1 + rt+1). Substituting for vt by using the period t government budget constraint [8],
we get the following Aaron condition for individual i of generation t:












at-DC-PAYG pension, not all individuals of a given generation need neces-
sarily have the same ranking of a funded and PAYG pension. Once again, the higher
the value of wi
tzi
t, the less likely it is that individual i will prefer the PAYG pension
system to the funded system.
If the covariance between the wage rate and labor participation rate across individ-
uals in each generation is zero, then for the young individual with the average income in
period t, both the wage and labor participation rates drop out of the Aaron condition
which reduces to
(1 + rt+1) < (1 + nt): (9)
104.3 The Sustainability of DB-PAYG Pension Systems
The Aaron conditions derived above for DB-PAYG pension systems assume that the
system does not collapse in period t+1 due to a lack of young people. Sustainability is
never an issue for DC-PAYG systems. If the fertility rate, wages or labor participation
decline from one generation to the next then this simply means that retirees get a
worse return from the pension system than they would have otherwise. In contrast,
under a DB-PAYG system, each period the government has a xed liability to the old
generation. The main concern here is declining fertility rates in countries with generous
earnings related DB-PAYG systems, such as Germany, Austria and Italy. The birth
rate per woman by 2002 had fallen to 1.39 in Germany, 1.40 in Austria and 1.19 in
Italy (see Central Intelligence Agency 2002). In these situations, it is possible that to
balance its budget the government may have to raise the tax rate to a level that the
working population will not tolerate. Clearly, in such cases the maintenance of the
pension system becomes incompatible with a balanced budget. It is important that
this issue is kept in mind when interpreting Aaron conditions for DB-PAYG pension
systems - especially when it comes to making comparisons into the future.
5 Implications of the Modied Aaron Conditions
for the United States
Using US data over the period 1933-2001 and projections to 2023, I calculate all four
of the Aaron conditions discussed above. It will be shown that these Aaron conditions
dier quite signicantly. In particular, the question of whether individuals prefer un-
funded over funded systems becomes problematic in some cases as situations arise in
which certain unfunded systems are preferred over certain funded systems which in turn
are preferred over other unfunded systems. It should be emphasized that the results
11presented here are only illustrative. None of the PAYG pension systems considered here
is a close match for the actual pension system in place in the US during this period.
Nor do I attempt to calculate the actual rate of return received by US residents.
My objective is to demonstrate the importance of nding the Aaron condition that
corresponds as closely as possible to the pension system that individuals are actually
facing. I show that the welfare ranking of the funded and PAYG pension system can
depend on which Aaron condition is used, and that \double switches" (i.e., one type of
PAYG system being preferred to a funded system which in turn is preferred to another
PAYG system) can easily occur with real data.
Here I assume each period in the overlapping generations model lasts 25 years.
However, I will refer to cohorts rather than generations, since the gap between each
cohort in our analysis is only ve years. The rst cohort is young in the period 1933-
1958, and old in the period 1958-1983. The second cohort is young from 1938-1963, and
old from 1963-1988. Later cohorts are staggered at ve year intervals. The last cohort
considered is young from 1998-2023 and old from 2023-2048.
Consider rst the generation that is young (and working) in the period 1933-1958
and retired from 1958-1983.7 It is assumed that the midpoint of the period is representa-
tive of the period as a whole with regard to the real wage and labor participation rates.
The number of young people in each cohort is proxied by the total number of births 13
years before the start of the period. In other words, the number of young workers in
the 1933-1958 cohort is determined by the number of births in 1920.8 Therefore, it is
assumed implicitly that there is no net immigration of young people. Immigration of
old people does not matter if they are not eligible to receive the pension.
7The assumption that the period over which an individual works is of equal length to the period
of retirement is unrealistic. Also, no account is being taken of increases in longevity over time. The
former assumption will tend to bias the results towards preferring the funded pension system, while
the latter eect will partially counteract it.
8Data on US live births are taken from www.infoplease.com/ipa/A0005067
12The real interest rate for each period is computed by compounding 3-month treasury
bills over 25 years.9 This should be viewed as a lower bound on the rate of return on
a funded pension system, and hence biases the results towards preferring the PAYG
system.
I compare here the Aaron conditions derived assuming the covariance between the
wage and labor participation rates is zero for individuals of the same generation. Ev-
idence suggests that the covariance during the twentieth century was around zero for
men but positive for women.10 Furthermore, it must be remembered that the population
growth rate and labor participation rate might not be independent of the pension sys-
tem itself.11 So counterfactual comparisons of hypothetical PAYG systems with funded
pension systems based on actual data are not strictly valid. However, my objective here
is simply to illustrate that PAYG pensions can dier signicantly in the returns they
generate and that using a single measure like the Aaron condition to compare PAYG
with funded systems will generally not provide reliable results.
The specic Aaron conditions for DC-PAYG and DB-PAYG pension systems are
shown below in Tables 2 and 3, respectively.12 From equation (4) it follows that the
(gross) rate of return on the earnings related DC-PAYG system, denoted by (1+Mt+1),
in Table 2 is equal to (1+
t+1)(1+nt+1)(1+gt+1).13 As shown in section 3 above, this is
9Source: 3-Month Treasury Bill Rate, Secondary Market, H.15 Release, Federal Reserve Board of
Governors, www.federalreserve.gov/releases/h15/data.htm. Nominal interest rates are de
ated by the
Consumer Price Index for All Urban consumers: All Items, U.S. Department of Labor, Bureau of
Labor Statistic, www.bls.gov/cpi/home.htm.
10Again, see MaCurdy, Green, and Paarsch 1990 and Ehrenberg and Smith 1996.
11For example, if the rearing of children is time intensive, higher female labor participation would
be associated with lower fertility rates.
12See Davis (1995), Willmore and Bertucci (1999), and Blake (2000) for alternative estimates of the
traditional Aaron condition for dierent countries.
13(1+
t+1) denotes the growth rate of real mean wages. These data are taken from the U.S. Census
Bureau, Table P-3, www.census.gov/hhes/income/histinc/p03.html. (1 + gt+1) denotes the growth
rate of the Civilian Labor Force participation rate for individuals 16 years and over. Data source: U.S.
13also the rate of return for the average individual under a 
at DC-PAYG system. From
equation (7) it follows that the rate of return on the ER-DB-PAYG system, denoted by
(1 + Mt), in Table 3 is equal to (1 + 
t)(1 + nt)(1 + gt). The Aaron condition for the
average individual under a 
at DB-PAYG system, in contrast, simply equals (1 + nt).
Insert Table 2 Here
Insert Table 3 Here
Table 2 compares the rate of return of dened contribution PAYG systems with
that of a funded system (1+rt+1). It can be seen that for the rst six cohorts (starting
in 1933), the return from the DC-PAYG system (whether of the earnings related or 
at
variety) exceeds that from the funded system. For later cohorts the return from funded
pension provision improves signicantly while the return from DC systems tends to
decline (due to the decline in population growth rates).
Table 3 compares the rate of return of dened benet (DB) systems (
at or earnings
related) with that of a funded system. For the rst six cohorts (starting in 1958), the
return from the ER-DB-PAYG system exceeds that from the funded system. For the
nal three cohorts, this result is reversed and a funded system provides the highest
return. This reversal is due to the lower population growth rate (1 + nt) over the later
cohorts. Assuming that this trend in lower population growth continues in the future,
funded systems will continue to provide higher returns for cohorts to come. The return
from the 
at DB-PAYG system is the worst of the three with no tendency to improve
as it is completely based on the declining population growth rate.
For ve of the cohorts it is possible to compute rates of return for both dened-
contribution (DC) and dened-benet (DB) PAYG systems. Table 4 provides a ranking
of the return of all pension systems that were discussed above for these cohorts.
Insert Table 4 Here
These ndings raise a number of interesting issues. First, for four out of ve of
Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics, www.bls.gov/cps/cpsatabs.htm.
14these cohorts, ER-DB pensions gave the highest return. However, the rate of return
from ER-DB pensions has been declining over the last few cohorts. This is primarily
due to the falling fertility rate, which eventually starts to aect retirees under an ER-
DB-PAYG system as well. DC systems experienced falling returns earlier because of
the dierence in reference periods (DB systems depend on the growth rate of wages,
fertility, and labor participation in period t+1 while DC systems depend on the growth
rates in period t).
Second, the 
at DB system generally gave the worst return of all systems (last in
the ranking 3 out of 5 times) as its return is solely based on the diminishing population
growth rate.
Third, for all but one of the cohorts the return of the funded system lay between
two types of PAYG systems.
Fourth, if the ER-DC-PAYG system was projected forward further it is probable
that its rate of return would remain below that of the funded system. Thus, it seems
that the cohort that is young in the period 1988-2013 is at a threshold beyond which
the rate of return on both ER-DC and ER-DB PAYG systems are likely to fall below
the rate of return on a funded system. The return on 
at DB-PAYG systems for the
average person has always been lower than under a funded system except for the cohorts
that were young in 1968-1993 and 1973-1998.
6 Conclusion
This article has shown that comparisons of the rates of return of PAYG and funded
pension systems are rather more complex than is suggested by the original Aaron con-
dition which does not distinguish between dierent types of PAYG systems. The key
distinctions are between dened benet (DB) and dened contribution (DC) PAYG sys-
tems, and between earnings related and 
at rate PAYG systems. The standard Aaron
15condition also fails to take account of variations in the labor participation rate both
within and across generations.
To obtain actual estimates of the rates of return on PAYG systems a number of
simplifying assumptions had to be made. However, two clear results emerge from the
analysis. First, the result of a comparison between a PAYG and funded system can
be very sensitive to how the PAYG system is specied. Second, the rate of return on
a PAYG system becomes increasingly unattractive over time when the fertility rate
declines, as it has in most OECD countries in the last few decades.
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17Table 1: Dierent PAYG Pension Systems
Dened contribution Dened benet
Earnings related ER-DC-PAYG ER-DB-PAYG
Flat Flat DC-PAYG Flat DB-PAYG
Table 2: Aaron Conditions for DC-PAYG Pension Systems
Cohort 1 +  
t+1 1 + nt+1 1 +  gt+1 ER-DC Average 
at DC 1 + rt+1
1933-1958 1.499a 0.969 1.027b 1.492 1.492 0.511
1938-1963 1.499 1.249 1.034 1.935 1.935 0.634
1943-1968 1.362 1.568 1.076 2.297 2.297 0.793
1948-1973 1.349 1.791 1.091 2.636 2.636 1.355
1953-1978 1.292 1.469 1.129 2.143 2.143 1.166
1958-1983 1.266 1.306 1.103 1.822 1.822 1.232
1963-1988 1.435 0.866 1.095 1.360 1.360 1.386
1968-1993 1.526c 0.880 1.044d 1.402 1.402 1.348
1973-1998 1.534c 0.883 1.028d 1.392 1.392 1.467
1978-2003 1.529c 1.111 1.002d 1.702 1.702 1.675
Notes:
a: The mean wage in 1945 is based on value of 1947.
b: The labor participation rate of 1948 is substituted for the missing value of 1945.
c: Based on extrapolation of mean wage data up to 2001.
d: The labor participation rate of 2002 is substituted for the missing value of 2005.
18Table 3: Aaron Conditions for DB-PAYG Pension Systems
Cohort 1 +  
t 1 + nt 1 +  gt ER-DB Average 
at DB 1 + rt+1
1958-1983 1.548 0.969 1.027 1.541 0.969 1.232
1963-1988 1.499 1.249 1.034 1.935 1.249 1.386
1968-1993 1.362 1.568 1.076 2.297 1.568 1.348
1973-1998 1.349 1.791 1.091 2.636 1.791 1.467
1978-2003 1.292 1.469 1.129 2.143 1.469 1.675
1983-2008 1.266 1.306 1.103 1.822 1.306 1.609g
1988-2013 1.435 0.866 1.096 1.362 1.866 1.609g
1993-2018 1.526a 0.880 1.044b 1.402 1.880 1.609g
1998-2023 1.534a 0.883 1.028b 1.392 1.883 1.609g
Notes:
a: Based on extrapolation of mean wage data up to 2001.
b: The labor participation rate of 2002 is substituted for the missing value of 2005.
c: Based on extrapolation of wage rate series from 1992-2001.
Table 4: Ranking of returns from PAYG and funded systems
Cohort Highest return 2nd highest 3rd highest 4th highest
1958-1983 DC ER-DB funded av. 
at DB
1963-1988 ER-DB funded DC av. 
at DB
1968-1993 ER-DB av. 
at DB DC funded
1973-1998 ER-DB av. 
at DB funded DC
1978-2003 ER-DB DC funded av. 
at DB
Note: DC stands for ER-DC PAYG as well as the average return from the 
at DC PAYG system, as
the rates of return from these two are identical.
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